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EQUIVOCAL CLAIMS? AMBIVALENT CONTROLS? 
LABOUR MIGRATION REGIMES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Elspeth Guild* 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this paper is to examine claims about labour migration re-
gimes in the European Union (EU). The European context is a particularly inter-
esting one as it is highly dynamic and reveals deep cleavages in perceptions 
and meanings of control. I will examine the subject under the following head-
ings: 
1. The European integration dynamic; 
2. Fragmentation and the foreigner; 
3. Tools of control and control of tools. 
 
This is an examination of a labour migration scheme which is designed around 
the abolition of controls on economic migration of all kinds on persons depend-
ing on reciprocity on the basis of nationality. It reveals a number of features 
which confound may commonly held premises about labour migration: 
• The abolition of controls on labour migration has had a minimal effect on 
movement of workers in the EU notwithstanding the EU’s latest enlarge-
ments to relatively poor states in Southern and Central and Eastern 
Europe;1 
• The entitlement of intra-EU labour migrants to equal treatment with nation-
als and full access to social benefits has not resulted in widespread abuse 
nor in a diminution by Member States of their social benefits or concerted 
attempts to limit access by labour migrants (with notable exceptions such as 
the UK);2 
• Very generous rules on family reunification has not resulted in widespread 
‘abuse’ in fact notwithstanding the right to be joined by a wide range of 
family members, most labour migrants are joined only by spouses and 
young children only; 
                                         
*  e.guild@jur.ru.nl.  
1  Galgoczi, Leschke and Watt 2009. 
2  Triandafillidou and Gropas 2007. 
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• The identity move from discriminated against ethnic minority for-
eigner/migrant to individual entitled to equality and increasingly invisible 
as a target of racism can take place very quickly. The key appears to be 
public leadership committed to equality; 
• When labour migrants are beneficiaries of full equal treatment rights in 
wages and working conditions, secure residence rights and a right to family 
reunification, they cease to be categorized as ‘unwanted’ migrants even if 
they work in disfavoured sectors which are relatively poorly paid; the dis-
course of highly skilled workers as welcome and low skilled migrant work-
ers as unwanted disappears; 
• When states lift their hand off labour migration allowing people to make 
their own choices neither does this operate as a solution to labour needs 
nor unemployment. People do not necessarily or, in the EU example, even 
normally or usually move from countries of high unemployment and low so-
cial benefits to countries with low unemployment and high social benefits. 
Where states have labour shortages their administrations are still required 
to take active efforts to recruit labour migrants as only statistically low 
numbers of persons move spontaneously; 
• This experience characterised by high and rapid achievement of social in-
clusion and harmony tends to be disregarded when EU policy makers come 
to address their question of labour migration from outside the EU; 
• The lesson which the EU does seem to have retained from the abolition of 
controls on movement of persons for economic purposes is territorial. The 
completion of the Schengen area without internal border controls on the 
movement of persons has been a substantial success for the participating 
countries (which do not include Ireland and the UK). 
THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DYNAMIC 
The European Union is founded on three international treaties which have been 
subject to regular amendment and addition but which have retained their pri-
mary objective – the creation of an internal market – and added to it the es-
tablishment of monetary union. The creation of the internal market means, ac-
cording to these treaties, the abolition on the control of persons crossing intra 
Member State borders and free access to the labour market and self employ-
ment for nationals of the Member States.3 Thus, in labour migration terms, the 
purpose which the EU was given in 1957 (and which has remained with it) has 
been to oblige Member States to abandon control over labour migration of 
                                         
3  And their third country national family members who accompany or join them there. 
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nationals of the participating states.4 In this regard the EU is a de-securitization 
project as regards labour migration.5  
In order to achieve the project, a series of activities along the way were 
necessary and surprisingly often engaged the vexed question of labour migra-
tion. First, the EU had to establish its law as taking precedence over national 
law. This was a monumental task which required civil servants in the Member 
States to be persuaded to apply EU law rather than national labour migration 
rules in respect of nationals of the Member States.6 To succeed in this objective, 
the national courts of the Member States were engaged – first to accept that 
EU law has priority, secondly that the decisions of the European Court of Justice 
which interpret EU law take priority over decisions of their national courts (su-
preme courts etc) and thirdly to discipline civil servants who failed to apply EU 
law.7 This process took place gradually over a period of about 30 years from 
1957-1987 with many set backs along the way but eventually arriving more or 
less at the objective. There are still examples of Member States failing prop-
erly to implement EU free movement of persons rules and the ECJ judicially 
slapping their wrists for failure to fulfil their obligations. Generally, however, 
where caught misapplying EU free movement rules, Member States change 
their rules and practices to conform, even where there has been substantial po-
litical investment in the issue.8  
The loss of control over labour migration of nationals of the EU Member 
States is fairly complete. EU nationals know they are entitled to move and look 
for work anywhere in the EU. Employers know that they can hire EU nationals 
without checking for work or residence permits.9 State authorities are often un-
aware of who is on their territory or only become aware of the economic mi-
grant some time well after he or she has begun working there for some time, 
for instance when the EU migrant worker files a tax return. Even those states, 
which keep an eye on who is on the territory through population registers, do 
not always capture EU nationals. When one such state, Germany, argued that 
                                         
4  Guild 2004. 
5  Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre 1993. 
6  Majone 1994. 
7  Burley and Mattli 1993. 
8  A good example of this relates to the attempt by a number of EU states to regain control 
over the migration of third country national family members of migrant EU nationals. The 
ECJ found these efforts inconsistent with the EC Treaty and required the states to aban-
don their control practices. Within six months, all the offending states had changed their 
policies and practices (Metock, ECJ 25 July 2008). Handoll 2009.  
9  Enlargement of the EU creates ambiguities when nationals over accession states are 
usually not permitted free movement as wrokers immediate but have to wait a specified 
number of years before enjoying that status. Nonetheless, there has never been a 
limitation on free movement for other purposes including self-employment – Huysmans 
2000. 
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it was entitled to include in its database on foreign nationals, details of EU citi-
zens exercising their rights, the ECJ retorted that this was unnecessary as 
anonymous information was sufficient for the purpose and was less intrusive on 
the data protection rights of individuals. Further the ECJ held illegal the Ger-
man argument that the personalised data was necessary for fighting crime as it 
discriminated between EU citizens from other Member States and German citi-
zens who were not subject to inclusion on the database.10 
While the grip of Member State bureaucracies was being prized off la-
bour migrants who were nationals of other Member States, so too the number 
of Member States was changing. While the EU began with six Member States 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) it gained: 
• Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973 (current populations: 5.5 million, 4.5 
million and 61 million); 
• Greece in 1981 (current population: 11.2 million); 
• Portugal and Spain in 1986 (current populations: 10.6 million and 45.8 
million);  
• Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 (current populations: 8.3 million; 5.3 
million; 9.2 million); 
• Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Po-
land, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004 (current populations: 0.8 million, 10.4 
million, 1.3 million, 10.0 million, 2.2 million, 3.3 million, 0.4 million, 38.1 
million, 5.4 million and 2.0 million) and 
• Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (current populations 7.6 million and 21.5 
million).11 
 
The enlargement process is not yet over.12 There are currently three candidate 
countries: Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey and five potential candidate coun-
tries: Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia (not to mention Iceland). 
Each has its own timetable and action plan. The combined population of the EU 
is just under 500 million ranging from 82.5 million in Germany (though the 
population was increased by a third when reunification of East and West Ger-
many took place in 1990) to under 0.5 million in Malta. Of the candidate and 
potential candidate states, the only one with a population over 7.5 million 
(Serbia) is Turkey with a population of 72.5 million people.  
As regards labour migration, the control claims of the Member States are 
gradually abandoned in the context of enlargement. Twice, in 1973 and in 
1995, the nationals of the Member States joining the EU were not subject to 
                                         
10  C-524/06 Huber 16 December 2008. 
11  Verdun and Croce 2005. 
12  House of Lords 2006. 
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any temporary restriction on free movement of workers. From one day to the 
next, all the states had to abandon their control claims over migrant workers 
from Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 
1995. In the 2004 enlargement, workers from Cyprus and Malta were ac-
corded immediate free labour migration rights. However, for all the other 
states engaged in the enlargements there has been a delay in the abandon-
ment of labour migration controls over their nationals. The usual period for the 
delay is 5-8 years. The end of the delay period arrived on 1 May 2009 for 
the Member States which joined on 1 May 2004 (with an exceptional extra 
two years for Austria, Germany and the UK). For Bulgaria and Romania, 2012 
will be the final date for lifting controls (other than a possible exceptional two 
year period).  
For the purposes of European integration, it makes no sense to discuss inte-
gration without bearing in mind the dramatically changing composition of the 
EU-integration into what is a more useful question. Each Member State has a 
vote at the Council, sends a Commissioner to the European Commission, a judge 
to the European Court of Justice and participates in the European Parliament 
by way of direct suffrage which while taking into account the populations of 
the Member States also ensures that the small Member States are entitled to 
elect deputies. It is not just the space and population which is transformed by 
enlargement, the institutions as well undergo substantial changes.13 
Regarding workers, however, it is worth remembering that on 9 December 
2004 the UK’s final judicial instance, the House of Lords, gave its judgment14 
regarding the legality of the UK immigration authorities stationing their officers 
at Prague airport (Czech Republic) to advise airlines not to permit some pas-
sengers to board planes bound for the UK. The reason for UK immigration offi-
cers to advise airline staff to prohibit boarding to some persons was on the 
basis of ethnic origin and immigration suspicions. The UK authorities feared that 
some passengers who were Czech nationals but ethnically Roma might make 
asylum applications which the UK authorities considered unfounded as they 
deemed the Czech Roma to be disguised economic migrants, if these passen-
gers arrived in the UK. The UK government fears were fully described in terms 
of percentages of asylum applications and rejection rates for Czech Roma over 
the preceding years. The UK court found the checks illegal on grounds of racial 
discrimination. However, on 1 May 2004, all Czech nationals, including ethnic 
minorities, became citizens of the European Union and entitled to free move-
ment as workers or to seek jobs and self employment in the UK or anywhere 
else in the EU. The same people, Czech Roma, who had been the subject of 
                                         
13  Meunier and McNamara 2007. 
14  R v SSHD ex p ERRC [2004] UKHL 55. 
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very intrusive exclusion policies of the UK authorities (unlawfully on the grounds 
of ethnic origin) had the right to move to work in the UK even before the UK’s 
highest court found the state exclusionary activity unlawful.15 While the UK 
court only found that the extraterritorial controls were illegal because they con-
stituted racial and ethnic origin discrimination (in other words not condemning 
the UK authorities for the practice of extraterritorial controls in general) the 
membership of the Czech Republic to the EU freed Czech Roma from any con-
trols on labour migration at all. One might say that the court was extremely 
timid in comparison with the UK state authorities which abolished labour migra-
tion control altogether for the persons in respect of whom, only shortly before, 
they had been spending substantial public resources to prevent their labour 
migration.16 
Loosening the grip of EU state authorities over labour migration by nation-
als of newer Member States is not self evidently easy. It must happen, but as 
the above example shows, it is often contested. Nonetheless it does happen 
because Member State authorities accept that it must happen.17 For instance, 
not only have almost all of the Member States which joined the EU in 2004 
opened their labour markets to workers from Bulgaria and Romania but so 
have Sweden, Greece, Spain and Portugal (in that order). In the context of 
candidate states, only Turkey presents a challenge as regards workers’ rights 
mainly because of migration politics in Austria and Germany. The other candi-
date states do not have populations sufficient large to been perceived by pol-
icy makers in the EU as an issue sufficiently serious to engage with.18 
Once the emphasis is on a right to free movement to work and the Member 
State authorities are prohibited from interfering with that right: they may not 
require nationals of other Member States to seek work permits, are barred 
from requiring nationals of other Member States to obtain residence permits 
etc. the question is why do people not move. According to the European Com-
mission, approximately 2% of the inhabitants of the EU live in a country other 
than that of their nationality. For the 2004 Member State nationals, the figure 
rose from 0.2% in 2003 to 0.5% by the end of 2007. A similar increase has 
occurred as regards Bulgarians and Romanians. As the Commission points out, 
of the 2004 Member States, mostly Poles, Lithuanians and Slovaks have 
moved, nationals of the rest of those states have mainly stayed at home. Of 
those who have moved, their main destination countries have been Ireland and 
                                         
15  Goodwin-Gill 2005. 
16  Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2008. 
17  Border controls have been a particularly contested area, see Atger-Faure 2008. 
18  European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/ 
reports_nov_2006_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=466&langId 
=en. 
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the UK. Of the 2007 Member State nationals, most have gone to Spain and 
Italy.19 Claims that there is a bottomless pool of labour migrants waiting to 
move as soon as controls are lifted are not substantiated by the EU experience. 
In fact, there are very few migrant workers available as most people will stay 
at home even though the unemployment and wage differentials are impressive.  
According to Eurostat, the EU’s statistical agency, in December 2008 unem-
ployment stood at 2.7% in the Netherlands and 14.4% in Spain. Statutory 
minimum wages are under 300 Euros per month in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Romania; between 301 and 999 Euros per 
month in the Czech Republic, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain and 
more than 1,000 Euros per month in the rest (at least the rest of those states 
which have minimum wages). The highest minimum wage is in Luxembourg at 
1,570 Euros per month.  
The average minimum salary in Denmark is the equivalent of 1,850 Euros 
per month, 1,277 Euros in Germany and 1,258 Euros in France. But the aver-
age salary in Portugal is 470 Euros per month, 246 Euros in Poland and 92 
Euros in Bulgaria (for some of these countries there is a narrow range).20 
Money does not explain EU migration patterns any more satisfactorily than 
unemployment rates. Further, notwithstanding the relative levels of movement of 
Romanians and Bulgarians to Spain since 1 January 2007 and the relatively 
high unemployment rate in that country, Spain lifted restrictions on movement of 
workers from the two countries as from 1 January 2009. Thus the decisions on 
labour migration which EU Member States make cannot be explained by the 
application of simplistic economic rational choice theory. What is original about 
the EU labour migration system is that it is based on reducing to the point of 
vestigial the labour migration control claims of the Member States and leaves 
in the hands of the individual the choice whether to move or not.21 At the same 
time, the system is characterised by substantial worker protection – maximum 
working hours, minimum holiday entitlements etc. Further, the Member States 
have comprehensive sickness insurance and health care systems, unemployment 
and social benefits for the elderly and their care. Social solidarity has not been 
impaired as a result of permitting unlimited labour migration in an ever larger 
EU. 
                                         
19  Press Release, European Commission ‘Free Movement of workers is good for Europe’s 
economy’, 18 November 2008. 
20  European Union, Minimum Monthly Salaries 2008 http://europeanrussianaffairs. 
suite101.com/article.cfm/european_union_minimum_monthly_salaries_2008.  
21  Guild 1999. 
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FRAGMENTATION AND THE FOREIGNER 
As outlined above, in a fairly short period of time, the EU has changed its size 
and shape and the status of people living within it.22 Many people move seam-
lessly from irregular status in one country to citizen of a Member State entitled 
to residence, work (and social benefits) without crossing any border or making 
any application. They are embraced by EU law, which transforms their status 
from irregular labour migrant in national law to EU citizen with an entitlement 
to unimpeded labour migration. The same is likely to happen again as en-
largement continues. This means that the border between legality and irregu-
larly, between state immigration control over labour market access and a pro-
hibition on state control is fluid. However, fluidity does not end there. Third 
country nationals who are family members of EU migrant workers are entitled 
to residence and access to employment, which the host Member State is not 
permitted to question or restrict. While third country national family members 
can be required to obtain visas for entry and residence cards (according to EU 
law rules) so long as their principal is a worker there can be no resources re-
quirement, no health insurance requirement and a right to equal treatment. 
Even if the third country national was irregularly in the host state before the 
marriage to an EU national, the state cannot ‘punish’ the couple for that ir-
regularity by requiring the third country national to leave to obtain a visa (this, 
according to the European Court of Justice would be disproportionate).23 Third 
country national family members of EU nationals who have exercised their 
working rights are defined by EU law – all spouses, children under 21 or over 
that age if dependent (it does not matter if children are married etc), ascend-
ing and descending relatives who are dependent on the worker and or his or 
her spouse. There is a duty to facilitate the admission of wider family members 
if they are dependent and in need.24 On the basis of equal treatment with that 
of own nationals, unmarried partners, civil partnership and same sex relation-
ships must be recognised for the purpose of residence and work of the third 
country national partner.25 Thus the state’s control over third country nationals is 
also fluid as they too move from the grip of national law to rights holders in EU 
law.  
There are a number of agreements with third countries (i.e. countries which 
are not EU Member States) which give their nationals the right to move to and 
work in the EU on the same basis as nationals of EU Member States. These 
countries are Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. An agreement with Turkey 
                                         
22  Mantu 2008. 
23  Kofman 2004. 
24  Carrera 2005. 
25  Article 2 Directive 2004/38. 
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gives its citizens who have gained lawful access to the labour market of a 
Member State the right to retain that labour market access and after four 
years to have free access to the labour market of that Member State. Some 
agreements with other third countries, such as Croatia and Macedonia, include 
provisions which permit their nationals to have access to self employment in any 
Member State. However, under these agreements, the individual must obtain a 
residence permit though the rules on the issue of the residence permit must not 
add further (national) criteria to those contained in the agreements themselves. 
A variety of other agreements with third countries provide a right for compa-
nies of the third country to send their workers to an EU Member State to carry 
out services, while still more agreements provide a right to equal treatment in 
wages and working conditions and in social security for their workers who are 
working (lawfully) in the EU.26 
From 1999, the EU was accorded a series of powers to adopt legislation 
regulating the status of foreigners who are third country nationals (ie not na-
tionals of any EU state). These powers cover asylum, border controls and mi-
gration.27 Statistically, the largest single group of third country nationals who 
gain access to the EU labour market are people granted entry on the basis of 
family reunification. As regards family reunification of third country nationals 
with other third country nationals who are already resident in the EU, Member 
States no longer are entitled to apply their national laws. An EU directive sets 
out the conditions which can be applied. While the threshold for family reunifi-
cation of third country nationals is higher in terms of the conditions which must 
be fulfilled than its counterpart for EU nationals who exercise their treaty 
rights, nonetheless, it is EU law not national law. 28 The loss of control over ac-
cess to the territory and labour market of third country nationals which is inher-
ent in the family reunification directive was sufficient to inspire three Member 
States, Denmark, Ireland and the UK to refuse to participate. They remain in 
splendid isolation running their own immigration systems regarding family re-
unification.  
For family reunification of third country nationals there is still the appear-
ance of national control. Family members may still be required to obtain visas 
from national consulates, they are required to obtain work and residence per-
mits when they arrive in the destination EU state. For the individual, it appears 
as if the state is still very much in control – applying its laws, requiring national 
rules to be complied with. But the reality is somewhat different. EU law defines 
the conditions for family reunification of third country nationals with third coun-
                                         
26  Billet 2009 (forthcoming).  
27  Peers and Rogers 2006. 
28  Oosterom-Staples 2007. 
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try nationals already in the EU. Member States no longer have the power to 
change the rules of family reunification. They have a few discretionary clauses 
(like the much discussed provision on integration measures and tests)29 which 
were inserted, often at the last minute into the EU measures to provide an as-
surance to national officials that they are still in charge.30 But as Groenendijk 
has pointed out, because these provisions exist in EU measures, they are subject 
to interpretation by the European Court of Justice – the Member States no 
longer have the last word even on these little ‘sovereignty’ cards.31 While it will 
be some time before the full effect of the transformation of state sovereignty 
will become apparent, it is already in practice. In a debate in the Netherlands 
in 2008, some political actors wanted to raise the age limit for spouses to be 
able to join third country national sponsors there. Denmark had recently done 
just this.32 The matter never even became a serious part of the debate on fam-
ily reunification as the EU Directive does not permit Member States to add new 
obstacles to family reunification. 
Similarly, the EU adopted a measure creating a common status of EU third 
country national who has been resident for five years lawfully on the territory 
of a Member State. For these persons, not only is there a common EU status 
which protects labour rights and excludes their expulsion except on the limited 
grounds permitted in the Directive, but it also extends the possibility for long 
term resident third country nationals to move and exercise economic activities in 
other Member States. Once again, in the Directive there are a number of ‘sov-
ereignty’ card provisions which provide the appearance of control by Member 
State authorities. But the matter is now EU law and no longer sovereign to the 
Member States. Again, for labour migrants, it may appear that it is still the 
Member States that are in charge, but the Member States’ margin of action is 
highly diminished, their authorities are bound to apply the EU directive (except 
for Denmark, Ireland and the UK which, once again, chose not to participate). 
The odd result of this measure in the context of enlargement is that, for in-
stance, a Russian national who has lived and worked for five years in Romania 
and obtained a long term resident card, will have a right to access to the Ger-
man labour market (subject to delays which Germany can apply for up to 12 
months) sooner than a Romanian national.33 
The most complicated issue in the EU as regards national control over extra 
Union labour migration is first access to the labour market. Here, notwithstand-
                                         
29  Oers, R. van 2009. 
30  Groenendijk, Fernhout, Van Dam, Van Oers and Strik 2006. 
31  Groenendijk 2007.  
32  Walter 2008. 
33  Carlier and Guild 2006. 
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ing proposals first put forward by the European Commission in 2001, it was 
only in 2009 that a measure was adopted on the subject.34 For my purposes, 
what is important is what it means for sovereignty and the right of states to 
control migration. The decision of the European Commission to break economic 
migration into different strands – highly skilled, researchers and students, inter-
company transferees and low-skilled seasonal workers – and to make different 
sets of rules of each of the categories is very significant regarding the way in 
which labour migration control is perceived among the Member States. This is 
because it heralds the allocation of different rights to third country national 
workers depending on their value to the EU labour market. Unlike the lesson of 
EU national labour migration where all workers are entitled to the highest level 
of rights available to national workers, when it comes to third country national 
migrant workers it looks like there will be substantial differences. Highly quali-
fied third country national workers are given better rights than lower skilled 
workers. The principle appears to be that the economically stronger should be 
privileged and the equally needed by economically weaker migrant workers 
should be deprived of rights. These rights take the form of security of resi-
dence, equality of wages, access to social benefits and family reunification. 
The illusion of control (to which I will return below under tools of control) is 
compounded by the illusion of capacity to choose. The mantra of ‘managed 
migration’ based on rational choices about labour market needs drives the vi-
sion that state authorities are capable of choosing ‘good’ labour migrants and 
rejecting ‘poor’ labour migrants. Indeed, good usually means highly skilled and 
poor means exactly that those without resources. In the European context there 
are traditionally three mechanisms which have been applied to separate the 
good from the poor labour migrants and thus to achieve what is considered a 
beneficial managed migration system. First, potential labour migrants must fulfil 
criteria on skills – unless they meet skills levels established by national legisla-
tion they will not be permitted to migrate. Secondly, the authorities apply a 
labour market test – is there anyone in the EU labour market already who 
could take the job – if so the labour migrant should be rejected. Thirdly, salary 
levels – only labour migrants who will be paid over a certain salary will be 
admitted. The skills criteria has been subject to endless discussion about what 
kind of skills are needed – should there be priority lists of skills in short supply, 
how are such lists to be determined. Regarding the labour market test, the 
fairly obviously illusory nature of such a test, which must be applied to the la-
bour market of 27 Member States with a population just short of 500 million, is 
hard to disguise. The local nature of so many labour markets is evidenced by 
                                         
34  Directive 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
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the low movement rates of nationals of EU Member States. The salary require-
ment has been very seductive to some Member States but then has fallen out of 
favour to some extent as it means the potential migrant must already have a 
job offer, which could stifle initiative and self-employment which would create 
jobs. Also, some jobs carry high salaries but not high social acceptance. Under 
the Dutch skilled migrant programme a salary level is determinant for the issue 
of labour migration authorisations except for three categories of workers: 
football players, Imams and prostitutes. The three sit uncomfortably beside one 
another as a class of their own. 
Another problematic aspect of the good and poor labour migrant ap-
proach in the EU is that Member States acknowledge very different labour 
market needs. For instance, in Spain and Poland, the authorities acknowledge 
that their economies need agricultural workers in substantial numbers. While 
other Member States also need agricultural workers they are often less honest 
about the fact. Thus a good labour migrant in Poland is not necessarily the 
highly skilled Indian IT worker who was the object of Germany’s Green Card 
system launched in 2000 (and revised in 2004) but the low skilled Ukrainian 
agricultural worker. Further, with the ageing of Europe, more and more care 
workers willing to work in the home with the elderly are needed.35 In Italy 
there is substantial labour migration from the Philippines and elsewhere to fulfil 
this need.36 But these workers are not classified as the good migrants according 
to the scheme of directives even though they are the ones which the economy 
may need most. The dominance of the managed migration discourse means that 
the good labour migrant is always defined as the highly skilled/paid. Because 
he or she is classified as desirable, there is an assumption that there is competi-
tion among states to encourage the individual to move to their country. This as-
sumption then justifies the differential treatment of the desirable labour mi-
grant. In order to encourage him or her to come to the EU the rules of migration 
must include entitlements to good conditions of entry, family reunification, la-
bour market access, social conditions and access to social benefits.37 
However, the contrary assumption applies to the poor labour migrant, al-
though he or she may be even more valuable to the economy than the highly 
skilled/paid labour migrant. Because he or she has been classified as poor, it is 
assumed that there is an enormous pool of such migrants available to come to 
the host state to do the work. Thus according to the market approach to human 
beings, there is no need to provide good conditions of entry, family reunifica-
tion, labour market access, social conditions or access to social benefits to these 
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persons. The assumption about the nature of the work and its value to the econ-
omy justifies that discriminatory treatment of the labour migrant. So-called low 
skilled workers are made subject to restrictions that their residence will be tem-
porary as when they leave the assumption is that there will be others will to 
take their place. These workers are then accorded a more precarious work and 
residence permit, excluded from social benefits and often excluded also from 
long term residence status.38  
As has been extensively examined in gender studies, the allocation of the 
titles highly skilled and low skilled tend to have gender consequences. They are 
used to justify differentials in treatment, which reinforce gender stereotypes 
and have the consequence of limiting women’s access to economic stability. Ann 
Tickner’s work in particular has focused on the intersection of migration and the 
precariousness of women’s economic status.39 In the European labour migration 
context, it is also interesting to note that many of the jobs most likely to fulfil 
the highly skilled categories are those where there is a differential in gender 
privileging men. Some of the medical sciences and teaching are an exception 
to this norm but those exceptions only emphasis the generality of the gender 
element in the determination of high skilled versus low skilled labour migrants. 
TOOLS OF CONTROL AND CONTROL OF TOOLS 
The mechanisms of labour migration have been changing in the EU over the last 
ten years. Two developments are particularly important. The first has been a 
trend to carry out labour migration control outside the state. Thus EU states re-
quire labour migrants to be outside the country when they or their employer 
makes an application for a work permit and that the labour migrant obtain a 
visa before travelling to the state. Paradoxically, this externalisation of labour 
migration control has the effect of putting the individual much farther from the 
officials who must apply a labour market test (if one is applied at all). One 
solution which the UK has adopted, is to move the decision making abroad as 
well in order to follow the externalisation of the control process. So instead of 
officials with knowledge of the labour market making the decision on access for 
a potential immigrant, it is officials in the UK consulates in the country of origin 
who make the decision. In terms of ministerial competence, the employment and 
trade ministries are edged out of the equation and the interior ministry seeks to 
embed itself in the consulates which belong to the foreign ministry. As the ex-
ternalisation takes hold, the control of the foreign ministries becomes more evi-
dent. In order to diminish this rather troublesome formula, many of the labour 
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migration control mechanisms are transferred to agencies – in the UK case the 
job of assessing and issuing visas was hived off to the UK Visas Agency (under 
joint foreign and interior ministry control) and dealing with immigration controls 
to UKBA (UK Borders Agency).  
The second development is the identity of those engaged in controlling la-
bour migration. As Guiraudon has developed, the move of mechanisms of con-
trol has not only moved out beyond the borders it has also moved within the 
state. The introduction of sanctions against employers for hiring workers who 
have not been authorised by the state has been a regular feature of EU state 
labour market control over the past ten years.40 In 2009, the EU adopted a 
Directive on sanctions against employers for employing undocumented mi-
grants. This has the interesting effect of once again changing the nature of sov-
ereignty as regards this type of tool in relation to labour migration. On the one 
hand, the private sector is obliged to take on the task of labour migration con-
trol on pain of sanctions, usually financial penalties, for failure correctly to 
carry out the task, on the other hand, the power to make rules about those 
sanctions moves away from that of the Member State into the hands of the EU 
authorities.  
This change in the nature of the actors is not exclusive to the way in which 
labour migration is controlled within the state. It also applies in the extraterrito-
rial move as well in the form of carriers’ sanctions. The development of private 
sector controls sanctioning employers accompanies the measures which have 
already been adopted at EU level sanctioning travel companies (excluding 
train companies) which bring to the external border of the EU persons who are 
not then admitted.41 These sanctions have been put into place as a mechanism 
to make sure that visa rules are respected – the transport companies are re-
quired to make sure that travellers have the right documents for entry into the 
EU so that those who do arrive at the borders are likely to be admitted on pain 
of a sanction against the transport company. 
The place of the controls bears attention. The tools of control in the EU are pri-
marily: 
Visas which must be obtained abroad, accompanied by sanctions on transport-
ers; 
• External border controls which may be carried out at external borders or 
more often just beyond the borders of EU states; 
• Work and residence permits which must be obtained in the state, accom-
panied by sanctions on employers; 
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• Police registration systems whereby the worker must provide personal de-
tails. 
 
The disciplining measures are refusal of visas, entry, work or residence permits, 
police investigations, fines on transport companies, employers and expulsion of 
the worker. The measures take place in a variety of different places and by an 
increasingly diverse number of actors. There is a division of powers to make 
law between the EU and the Member States. As the Member States seek more 
consistency in how labour migration rules in other Member States are applied 
and carried out, so in the process they relinquish increasing power themselves 
to control labour migration. As the idea of making the private sector take more 
responsibility for labour migration in the form of transport companies checking 
work permits and employers subject to fines for employing migrants without the 
necessary documents, so too the capacity of the state to control labour migra-
tion is paradoxically weakened. Where the state previously took a more im-
portant role in certifying labour migrants one by one, as the control function is 
hived off to the private sector the capacity to know exactly what is going on is 
not necessarily enhanced. If one of the justifications for the move is that there 
will be public financial savings, then the commensurate increase in the number 
of labour inspectors is unlikely to take place.  
The EU is struggling at the moment with the question of where the tools are 
controlled. While the three ‘opted out’ Member States – Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK remain strictly sovereignist in respect of all the activities, the rest of the 
EU is moving in quite a different direction. Increasingly, measures on labour 
migration, border control, extra-territorial controls on movement of persons and 
visa issuing are all moving into the exclusive competence of the EU. The tools 
which Member States have, but also which they are obliged to use, are formu-
lated within the EU institutions. Once the measures are adopted the Member 
States are obliged to carry them out faithfully. Some activities have been hived 
off into EU agencies – specifically FRONTEX to which I will return below in 
greater depth. The control of the tools has moved to the EU though the tools of 
control must be carried out primarily by the Member States. 
As regards visas, short stay visas are a matter of EU law. The reasons for 
issuing or refusing to issue a short stay visa (Schengen visa) is a matter covered 
by the EU’s Common Visa Code became effective on 5 April 2010.42 As re-
gards long stay visas, some are covered exclusively by EU law rules – such as 
those for family reunification others are partially covered for instance in the 
highly skilled migrant directive though Member States retain the right to issue 
national visas. There are still very substantial variations among the Member 
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States in how they apply EU law on the issue even of short stay visas – while 
the overall refusal rate of short stay visas in the EU is about 10% the variations 
between Member State consulates in the same country can be very substantial 
indeed.43 For instance, as regards applications for short stay visas made in 
Nairobi, Kenya in 2007: 44 
• Germany: 4687 applications; 740 refusals; 
• France: 2808 applications; 248 refusals; 
• Italy: 2634 applications; 74 refusals; 
• Netherlands: 2556 applications; 247 refusals.45 
 
At the EU’s external border, there is a clearer picture of the changing control of 
the tools. On the one hand there is an EU regulation on admission and refusal 
of individuals at the external borders of the EU.46 This regulation has been in 
force since 2006 and requires officials carrying out border controls to do so in 
a manner which does not discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or 
gender. Further, where an official refuses admission to an individual this must 
be in accordance with the rules set out in the regulation. The individual must be 
given notice of refusal in writing and informed of his or her right of appeal 
against that decision. 
The control of the EU’s external border is coordinated by an EU agency, 
FRONTEX, which is charged with ensuring the proper coordination of the main-
tenance of external border controls.47 It is not charged with ensuring that the 
EU’s border control law is correctly carried out. FRONTEX has been very much 
in the news on account of its role coordinating maritime actions to prevent ir-
regular migration into the EU in the Atlantic around the Canary Islands (part of 
Spain) and in the Mediterranean around Malta and the Italian island of 
Lampedusa which is closest to the African coast.48 The activities of FRONTEX 
and the manner in which the operations it has been coordinating have been 
carried out are controversial. As its role is one of coordination, it depends on 
the Member States making available for actions their coast guard boats and 
personnel. These personnel and boats continue to be regulated according to 
national law rather than EU law resulting in fairly substantial incoherence 
among the actors. UNHCR has been particularly concerned about the activities 
                                         
43  Beaudu 2007. 
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45  See UNHCR Statistics on Refugee Protection 2007, table 13.  
46  The Schengen Borders Code: Regulation 562/2006. 
47  Regulation 2007/2004 establishing External Borders Agency. 
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as it is not clear that refugees are able to make their claims to asylum under 
the conditions of these controls.49 
As regards work and residence permits, a directive has been adopted on 
highly qualified migration only.50 The main weakness of the directive is that it 
neither sets a minimum standard nor a maximum one for the admission of highly 
qualified migrants to the EU. Thus Member States are not constrained either by 
upper or lower limits to issue work and residence permits in accordance with 
the Directive.51 For the moment this is still a matter of Member State control as 
regards first admission and residence for other categories of labour migrants. 
However, as mentioned above, there are agreements with third countries which 
require Member States to privilege the treatment of nationals of the other 
party.52 EU law, of course, regulates the issue of work and residence permits 
for third country national family members admitted under the Directive.53 Fur-
ther, once the labour migrant has lived for five years in the EU he or she will be 
eligible for long term residence status and access to the whole of the EU labour 
market thus control passes to the EU to make the rules and ensure that national 
officials apply them consistently and correctly.54 
Once inside the EU the border control picture changes again. The same 
regulation which establishes the common external border control regime also 
requires all EU states (except Denmark, Ireland and the UK) to abolish all inter-
nal controls on the movement of persons. It does not matter whether those per-
sons are EU nationals or third country nationals. The power of the state to con-
trol is prohibited. While at airports this is hard to see as security controls on 
identity carried out by airways replaces the identity controls which had been 
carried out by officials, the difference is important.55 On trains, roads and 
buses across Europe the change is immediately evident. In fact it is so evident 
that there is great annoyance when state officials carry out identity checks in-
                                         
49  ‘UNHCR and Frontex have begun discussions on cooperation, as foreseen in the Frontex 
Regulation and proposed by the Commission in its Communication on Reinforcing Man-
agement of the EU’s Southern Maritime Borders. UNHCR is willing to collaborate with 
Frontex to ensure that personnel deployed on joint operations are trained in the essential 
principles of international law and refugee protection. Guidance would appear also to 
be necessary on how border operations can be carried out in a way that ensures con-
sistent respect for international refugee law. UNHCR calls on the Presidency and other 
Member States to support development of this cooperation in relevant priority areas, in-
cluding training, exchange of information relevant to risk analysis, and others.’ UNHCR, 
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side their borders on travellers. These checks are still permitted under the EU 
rules which require the abolition of intra Member State border controls but they 
must not replace border controls.56 Their objective must be exclusively police 
measures and they must be justified. Thus these controls, in law, are very dif-
ferent from immigration controls. In practice they are gradually becoming so as 
well. The EU labour migrant whether an EU citizen or third country national 
does not (normally) encounter the state at the EU’s intra Member State borders. 
The encounter, if it occurs at all, will happen well after the individual has ar-
rived and may never happen.57  
A further restriction on the Member States’ right to control labour migration 
within the EU takes the form of the EU rules on service provision. If the third 
country national is working in one Member State and is sent to another by his 
or her employer to carry out a contract (even if this takes some time) EU rules 
protect the right of the business to send its employee across the EU border for 
this purpose. As there is no intra Member State border control, the individual 
moves to where the work is to be carried out, carries out the activity and gen-
erally returns home. The state may never be aware of the fact that the individ-
ual was on the territory. This has caused some Member States substantial an-
guish about who is on their territory but also about the collection of taxes in 
respect of work carried out on their territory. The Belgian authorities have put 
in place an on line registration system where enterprises must notify the state 
when any worker from outside Belgium comes to carry out services for more 
than three days in the country so that the state can impose social charges, taxes 
etc. it is unclear just how successful this system is.58 
In the 2010 climate of rising unemployment and great job insecurity, the 
possibility of posted workers arriving from other Member States to carry out 
contracts has become increasing politically charged. In Sweden, a highly con-
troversial case of a company which engaged Estonian workers and posted 
them to Sweden to carry out works without fulfilling the social and wage condi-
tions applicable to Swedish workers was determined by the European Court of 
Justice in 2007.59 Notwithstanding rage on the part of the trade unions, the ECJ 
upheld the right of companies to send their workers to carry out services across 
EU borders. The actual reasoning of the ECJ perhaps does not merit all the an-
tagonism which it has elicited. The court did not exclude the right of the state to 
ensure the wage and social standards are equivalent for posted workers as for 
national workers but found that Swedish legislation did not provide for the ap-
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plication of this power in accordance with EU law. In the UK, in February 2009, 
the posting of Italian and Portuguese workers to carry out works in Lincolnshire 
at the oil company Total’s refinery there gave rise to unauthorised industrial 
action by workers demanding ‘British jobs for British workers’. But most posting 
of workers passes unnoticed because there are no border controls on movement 
of persons within the territory (the UK excepted of course). The numbers and 
impact of posted workers also seems to militate against state authorities be-
coming aware of their presence except when there are substantial teams of 
workers who move together to a worksite. 
While the right of Member States to control labour migration within the EU 
and increasingly into it has diminished the desire to control has not. Within the 
part of Member States interior and justice ministries there continues to be sub-
stantial concern about the loss of control and the consequences which this has, 
not least on the professional futures of the individuals involved. On the one 
hand, the explosion of interest in all matters even tangentially connected with 
security which followed the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA provided 
legitimacy to those expressing concern about the loss of control over movement 
of persons, including labour migrants in the EU. On the other hand, the expo-
nential growth of technical capacity in information technology provided un-
dreamt of possibilities for collecting, storing and using information, including 
information about individuals. Interest in security as an issue of movement of 
persons and the possibility to collect and use information collided over the first 
ten years of the new millennium leading towards new ways of controlling 
movement of persons.60 The European Commission proposed a border package 
on 13 February 2008 aiming at establishing an EU entry/exist system register-
ing the movement of specific categories of third country nationals at the exter-
nal borders of the EU, as well as a border control mechanism (Automated Bor-
der Control System) enabling the automated verification of travellers’ identity 
based on biometric technology.61 The idea is that people will swipe themselves 
in and out of the EU under the watchful eye of border guards. Their information 
will be checked against the widest possible group of EU databases (for asylum 
seekers, criminals etc).62  
The security tools and techniques envisaged by the Commission are three-
fold: 
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1. The setting up of a new European-wide database containing specific in-
formation on certain categories of non EU-nationals; 
2. Interoperability of the database with other already existing and planned 
EU databases and biometric systems. 
3. The systematic checking of everyone entering and leaving the EU with at 
least three categories of persons: those third country nationals who have vi-
sas containing biometric data which will be checked at the border; third 
country nationals who do not need visas for a short stay in the EU whose 
biometric data will be taken at the border; citizens of the Union whose 
biometric data will be incorporated into their passports which will be 
swiped on entry and exit. 
 
It shows most starkly the changing nature of the ambition of control. What is 
new in the package is a threefold change in thinking about migration control. 
First, it is no longer about sovereignty and its cut free for state borders. In-
stead, it may take place anywhere no longer tied to the purpose of marking 
the border between places and states. Secondly, it is no longer about the divi-
sion of persons between citizens and foreigners. All persons would be subject to 
the system of control irrespective of nationality. Everyone is controlled when he 
or she is in the process of moving. Thirdly, control is intrinsically linked to the 
allocation of an identity which is held in a database (probably centralised). 
The individual is subject to a control of his or her identity against the prototype 
which is held by the control authority. Of course, the proposal raises a whole 
series of issues about protection of personal data. But more centrally, it indi-
cates a change in the way the EU perceives migration and people. The voca-
tion to control the foreigner is able to morph into an ambition to allocate iden-
tity and control any individual against the official, ideal identity. Labour migra-
tion control appears to give way, in this scenario to control which is no longer 
about labour nor even about migration as the citizen and the foreigner are 
equally subject to control. Nor is it ultimately related to the state and sover-
eignty as the actor at the heart of the control is the EU. It points towards a 
change in governmentality, to use Foucault’s term. There is a ground shift in the 
way in which the exercise of power constitutes authority and is inscribed on the 
body of the individual. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the outset of this paper I set out a number of contentions to be exemplified. 
Now I will asses those contentions on the basis of the research. First, regarding 
free movement of workers, the EU experience indicates that abolishing controls 
on labour migration based on reciprocity even among countries with very dif-
ferent standards of living, minimum wages, standards of social benefits and 
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unemployment rates does not result in (a) significant movement (b) a reduction 
of social solidarity or (c) a rise in xenophobia.  
Secondly, the EU experience of developing a labour migration system be-
yond national sovereignty and no longer on a reciprocal basis shows much 
greater fears of foreign workers which result in the diminution of rights and a 
restrictive approach. Thirdly, the move of power to control labour migration 
from state borders and sovereign decisions to EU mechanisms appears to facili-
tate the move beyond the borders to mechanisms of immigration control em-
bedded in third countries, the high seas (i.e. beyond sovereign territory) and 
into the private sector. The burden of carrying out controls is moved to carriers 
and employers, in other words the private sector. Fourthly, while security claims 
around hard state sovereign border controls have lost much of their appeal in 
the EU, instead, the security claims have fuelled the development of suprana-
tional electronic control systems repleted with large-scale data bases filled 
with personal data on people on the move. 
What the EU experiences seem to indicate for the future is an increasing ir-
relevance of state borders for the movement of labour migrants and an in-
crease of electronic surveillance detached from specific territorially symbolic 
places. The objective of the new forms of surveillance appear to be to track 
the individual and his or her economic activities in order to discipline a substan-
tial array of actors inside and outside the remit of state sovereignty as it is 
usually visualised on maps. 
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